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Centripetal Forces in China’s Economic Takeoff
ANURADHA DAYAL-GULATI and AASIM M. HUSAIN*
This paper uses provincial time series data from the People’s Republic of China to
empirically investigate two propositions relating to economic development: (i) that
economic takeoff—or an acceleration in economic growth—is associated with
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), possibly through technological transfer;
and (ii) that takeoff is accompanied, at least in the short term, by widening income
inequality. The results indicate that FDI flows have increased the rate of conver-
gence in per capita incomes across China’s provinces. However, the pattern of FDI,
which has gone mainly to the relatively wealthy provinces, has caused different
provinces to converge toward different steady states. [JEL O4, O11, O18]
E
conomic takeoff is often associated with technological transfer from other
countries, largely through foreign direct investment (FDI). Also, economic
development is often linked with rising inequality, at least in the short term. The
logic tying these two ideas together is straightforward—relatively prosperous
countries or regions tend to receive more FDI because they have the existing
infrastructure to support such projects. Hence, inequality across countries or
regions widens as a result of FDI, which in turn helps achieve economic takeoff.
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cated by institutional and policy differences across countries, which can render
comparisons problematic. As such caveats do not apply across regions of the same
country, provincial-level data from China over the past two decades can be used to
provide interesting empirical insight into these propositions relating to the process
of economic development.1, 2
China’s growth performance since the initiation of market-oriented reform in
1978 has been impressive. Real GDP has grown by an average annual rate of
almost 10 percent; real per capita output has averaged 81/4 percent a year. This
economic takeoff has coincided with large inflows of FDI, which have averaged
over US$40 billion (51/2 percent of GDP) annually in recent years. At the same
time, however, the variation in economic performance across provinces has
widened, particularly since the late 1980s. After declining in the late 1970s and
1980s, the dispersion of (the natural logarithm of) provincial per capita incomes
increased steadily in the 1990s (Figure 1).3 In 1978, real per capita income in the
richest province was around six times that of the poorest; by 1997, the multiple
had risen to almost eight (Table 1). Similarly, the pattern of FDI across provinces
and regions has differed sharply. The coastal region, for example, saw FDI inflows
averaging over 9 percent of regional GDP during 1993–97, while FDI in the
western and southeastern regions averaged only 1–2 percent over the same period.
The apparent widening disparity across China’s provinces—or groups of
provinces—raises the question of whether provincial per capita incomes have
diverged and, if so, why? This paper investigates the variation in economic perfor-
mance across provinces and empirically examines whether the poorer provinces
grew faster than the richer ones, which would suggest that all the provinces were
converging to the same steady-state real per capita income level.4 In addition, the
paper investigates the role of FDI and other structural and policy factors—
including the share of investment in provincial GDP, the dominance of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in industrial output, and the role of the banking
system—on economic growth over the period 1978–97. 
The analysis presented in this paper indicates that absolute convergence—
convergence of real per capita incomes in all provinces to the same steady-state
level—does not appear to hold over the past two decades, although there appears
to be evidence of conditional convergence—that is, convergence of provincial per
capita incomes to their own steady states. While structural characteristics of the
provincial economies—such as the share of investment to GDP and the share of
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1All references to China in this paper are to the People’s Republic of China.
2Strictly speaking, propositions in the literature regarding rising Kuznets-type income inequality
generally relate to widening disparity across income groups within a given country or region (see, for
example, Ben-David, 1993), while the analysis reported below refers to inequality of income growth rates
across provinces or regions within China. Clearly, widening disparity of one type need not necessarily be
associated with greater inequality in the other sense.
3The coefficient of variation—the standard deviation divided by the mean—of real per capita incomes
(also depicted in Figure 1) shows a similar pattern.
4As noted by Cashin and Sahay (1996), convergence of per capita incomes is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for a reduction in the dispersion of per capita incomes. SOEs in industrial output—have had some effect, the regional disparities appear
to be influenced primarily by the relative importance of FDI to the region. Indeed,
the inclusion of an FDI variable in the regressions results in a sizable increase in
the estimated rate of convergence of each region to its own steady state.
I. Absolute and Conditional Convergence
There is a growing literature on convergence of per capita incomes across and within
countries. If economies possess similar levels of technology and have similar prefer-
ences, then the neoclassical growth model predicts that all provinces would converge
to similar levels of real per capita income in the steady state. This is known as abso-
lute β convergence. Convergence of per capita incomes in this model is driven by the
assumption of diminishing returns to capital. When the stock of capital is low, each
addition to capital stock generates large increases in output. These increments tend to
decrease as the stock of capital increases. Accordingly, if the only difference between
economies is the initial level of capital stock, the neoclassical growth model predicts
that poorer economies will grow faster than rich ones. Regions with lower starting
capital-labor ratios will have higher per capita growth rates.
The empirical evidence suggests that convergence is absolute within homoge-
neous groups of economies. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992a, 1992b)
examine data for the U.S. states from 1880–1990, for Japanese prefectures over
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Table 1. Regional Real Per Capita Income
In 1992 Yuan In Percent of 1978 National Average
1978 1988 1997 1978 1988 1997
North 947 2,002 4,411 120  253  558
Beijing 2,435 5,302  11,229  308  670 1,420
Tianjin 2,003 3,895 8,626  253  492 1,091
Hebei 746 1,543 3,867  94  195  489
Shanxi 772 1,564 3,051  98  198  386
Inner Mongolia 630  1,525  2,967  80  193  375 
Northeast 1,202 2,488 4,650  152  314  588
Liaoning 1,436 3,081 5,823  182  390  736
Jilin 782 1,968 3,726  99  249  471
Heilongjiang 1,238 2,180 4,015  157  276  508 
Coastal 859 2,358 6,376  109  298  806
Shanghai 3,499 6,763  16,297  442  855 2,060
Jiangsu 772 2,192 6,046  98  277  764
Zhejiang 689 2,267 6,622  87  287  837
Fujian 636 1,735 5,635  80  219  712
Guangdong 795 2,684 6,700  101  339  847
Shandong 736 1,870 5,059  93  236  640
Hainan . . . 1,552  4,132  . . . 196  522
Southeast 560 1,275 2,858  71  161  361
Anhui 511 1,201 2,832  65  152  358
Jiangxi 509 1,112 2,611  64  141  330
Henan 477 1,173 2,644  60  148  334
Hubei 666 1,598 3,592  84  202  454
Hunan 655 1,306 2,679  83  165  339 
South 443 947  1,974  56 120 250
Guangxi 625 1,075 2,723  79  136  344
Sichuan 516 1,181 2,443  65  149  309
Guizhou 376 851  1,458  48 108 184
Yunnan 561 1,277 2,522  71  161  319 
West 622 1,408 2,557  79  178  323
Tibet . . . 1,246  2,571  . . . 158  325
Shaanxi 550 1,370 2,356  70  173  298
Gansu 566 1,115 2,089  72  141  264
Qinghai 1,010 1,700 2,670  128  215  338
Ningxia 722 1,487 2,618  91  188  331
Xinjiang 726 1,837 3,562  92  232  450 
China 791 1,788 3,586  100  226  453
Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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the period 1930–90, and for the regions of eight European countries from
1950–90. They find that convergence is absolute in that it applies when no other
variable other than the initial level of per capita income is held constant. Cashin
and Sahay (1996) examine convergence within India and find that variations in the
steady state values across states are not significant, implying absolute
convergence. 
If economies vary in their saving rates and technologies, then the neoclassical
growth model predicts conditional β convergence—provincial per capita incomes
still converge, but this convergence is conditional on each economy’s own steady
state. Across countries, the accumulated empirical evidence suggests that conver-
gence is conditional—after taking into account the effects of the rate of investment
and public policies on per capita growth.5 In most cases, the empirical work does
not provide robust estimates for the effects of a specific government policy on
growth, but it shows that the overall package of policies matters a great deal. The
tendency towards convergence is even stronger when a measure of human capital
in the form of educational attainment and health is included as an explanatory
variable.6
Thus, if all the provinces of China have similar levels of technology and
similar preferences, then they would converge to the same level of per capita
income in the steady state (absolute convergence). If, on the other hand, provinces’
technologies vary—possibly on account of their ability to attract FDI—they would
not be expected to converge to the same steady state, at least as long as their attrac-
tiveness to FDI remained varied.7
Capital and labor mobility—or openness—affect the rate of convergence. For
example, the availability of foreign finance makes it easier to acquire physical
capital. With the associated increase in the capital stock, diminishing returns set in
faster than they would in a closed economy. Hence, the speed of convergence is
greater in open economies than in closed ones.8
The evidence from China suggests that mobility of labor and capital across
provinces in China has been limited by policies.9 For instance, permission for
households to move from rural to urban areas has been restricted, and capital
5Public policies include the volume of consumption spending and the associated level of taxation,
some form of public investment, and institutional infrastructure.
6See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a review of this literature. 
7The creation of special economic zones in some of the coastal provinces may have facilitated the
inflow of FDI. To that extent, greater inflows of FDI could be associated with higher capital mobility,
thereby raising the rate of convergence. Nevertheless, other factors, such as proximity to Hong Kong SAR
and Taiwan Province of China—where much of the FDI originated—and their relatively richer human
capital endowment were likely also important factors explaining the coastal provinces’ ability to attract
FDI. Such differential ability to attract FDI, rather than access to FDI, would explain provinces’ conver-
gences to different steady states, as suggested by our results.
8Labor mobility is analogous to capital mobility and also tends to speed up an economy’s convergence
towards its steady state position. While the empirical evidence for convergence in the regional data after
taking into account net migration is not definitive, Cashin and Sahay (1996) find that migration is an espe-
cially slow means of equalizing per capita incomes. 
9Appendix II provides some background information on policies relating to capital and labor
mobility. mobility has also been dampened through tax policies and state control over bank
lending. Therefore, with partial capital and labor mobility, output convergence
across provinces is likely to be more gradual. However, policies have also sought
to directly redistribute incomes from relatively rich regions to poorer provinces,
thereby boosting the rate of convergence. Thus, a relevant question for China is
whether policies have, in total, contributed to the equalization of provincial per
capita incomes.
Previous empirical studies of provincial economic performance and conver-
gence in China include Bell, Khor, and Kochhar (1993) and Zhao (1998). Bell,
Khor, and Kochhar, using the real annual average provincial growth rate during
1981–90, find that poorer provinces tended to grow faster than richer ones. This
finding appears to depend critically on the sample period, however, during much
of which there was a rapid expansion in agricultural output following the liberal-
ization of the agricultural sector. Indeed, as Figure 1 indicates, the dispersion of
provincial per capita incomes narrowed considerably during this period, before
increasing steadily in the 1990s. Bell, Khor, and Kochhar also find that the propor-
tion of nonstate sector output in total output was positively related to growth,
while there was not a statistically significant relationship in their growth regres-
sion between FDI and growth.10 Zhao observes that the evolution of the ratio of
real per capita GDP in the richest province to that in the poorest province was U-
shaped, and empirically investigates the role of capital mobility in explaining this
trend. She finds that capital mobility across China’s provinces was relatively
limited during the 1980s and 1990s (see Appendix II).
Very recent work using our dataset by Graham and Wada (2001) and Aziz and
Duenwald (2001) generally supports and extends our findings. Graham and Wada
empirically assess whether inflows of FDI may have been associated with an
acceleration in total factor productivity (TFP) growth, possibly resulting from
technology transfer embodied in FDI inflows. They conclude that FDI has indeed
contributed to growth in the provinces and regions of China—particularly the
coastal region—that received sizable flows of this type, beyond what would be
expected from higher rates of capital formation enabled by the FDI. Aziz and
Duenwald investigate the implications of alternative convergence tests on our
results. Using the methodology suggested by Quah (1997) to more fully exploit
information contained in the data, they compute kernel estimates of the relative
income distribution of China’s provinces. Their results—that the distribution of
relative incomes is clustering toward two separate relative income clubs, with the
coastal provinces (which received the most FDI) gravitating towards a higher per
capita income mode than the other provinces—are consistent with our finding of
conditional convergence. 
In another related recent study,Wei and Wu (2001) empirically assess the rela-
tion between openness and rural-urban income inequality in Chinese cities and
their adjacent rural areas during 1988–93. Defining openness as the ratio of
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10By regressing average growth on only FDI, however, Bell, Khor, and Kochhar (1993) obtain a
significant positive coefficient.exports to GDP, and allowing for endogeneity by using distance to major seaports
as an instrument for openness, they find that while average openness increased and
overall rural-urban inequality also went up during this period, the correlation
across cities was negative. Together with our results, this would seem to suggest
that within-province inequality has improved while interprovincial inequality has
worsened. However, such an interpretation is subject to at least two qualifications.
First, the Wei and Wu results are based on a much shorter time period. Indeed, as
illustrated in Figure 1, much of the rise in the dispersion of average per capita
incomes across provinces took place after the period studied by Wei and Wu.
Second, special economic zones, which received a large share of China’s total FDI
inflows, were excluded from Wei and Wu’s sample. The direction in which this
exclusion might affect their result is not clear.
II. Regional Economic Performance
The basic estimation sample covers 28 provinces and municipalities over the
period 1978 to 1997.11 The output data used are provincial GDP in constant (1992
yuan) prices based on provincial price deflators.12 These estimates are divided by
the provincial population estimates to get provincial real GDP per capita, which is
used as a proxy for real per capita income.13 For analytical purposes, the data are
also divided into nonoverlapping intervals of five years each—1978–82, 1983–87,
1988–92, and 1993–97. Using the rate of growth of per capita output over a five-
year interval rather than a single year provides a simple means of smoothing out
short-run cyclical fluctuations in the rate of capacity utilization. This helps ensure
that this variable approximates output growth at the average rate of capacity
utilization.14 Averages of the explanatory variables over the five-year intervals are
used in the estimation procedures.
It is convenient for analytical purposes to divide the provinces and munic-
ipalities of China into six geographic regions—northern, northeastern, coastal,
southeastern, southern, and western. The northern region consists of Hebei,
Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia, as well as the municipalities of Beijing and
Tianjin. The northeast, which comprises Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang
provinces, has a higher concentration of state-owned industry than the rest of
the country. The coastal region—consisting of the municipality of Shanghai
Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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11Hainan and Tibet Autonomous Region were excluded from the estimations owing to lack of data
covering the entire sample period. Data for Chongqing, which became an independent municipality in
1997, are included in the data for Sichuan.
12See Appendix I for a description of the variables and data sources. 
13Time series income data at a macro level are not available. Consequently, per capita incomes and
per capita output are used interchangeably in this paper.
14Although there is some degree of arbitrariness in assuming that the duration of the business cycle
is five years and is synchronized across provinces and the periods chosen, a study by Khan and Kumar
(1997) using a similar approach does not find that the results are sensitive to the choice of a three- or five-
year average. It may also be noted that Husain (1998) finds that cycles were about that long in each region
in China, although the cycles tended not to be perfectly synchronized across regions. CENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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and the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and
Hainan—has been the recipient of the bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI),
particularly from Hong Kong SAR. The southeastern provinces—Anhui,
Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan—are adjacent to the coastal region and have
received an increasing share of FDI in recent years. The southern region, which
includes Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, is more dependent on the
agricultural sector than the other regions. Finally, the western region,
comprising Tibet Autonomous Region, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and
Xinjiang, accounts for around one half of China’s land area but only 7 percent
of its population.15
Growth Performance
Economic performance, as measured by the growth in real GDP per capita, has
varied significantly across regions and over time (Table 2). For China as a whole,
real per capita GDP growth averaged 6 percent in the early post-reform period
(1978–82), but picked up markedly in 1983–87 following the introduction of
market-oriented reforms in the agricultural sector. Per capita income growth
slowed during 1988–92, but picked up again in 1993–97 after the launch of a
major investment drive in the coastal region. 
While the coastal region grew at a faster pace than the rest of the country in
each of the four subperiods, the relative performance of the other regions varied.
For example, growth in the southeastern region exceeded the national average only
in the first and last subperiods, while that in the northern and northeastern regions
exceeded the national average only in the last subperiod. As a result, the relative
position of the regions in terms of the average level of real per capita GDP has
shifted, and each region’s share in China’s overall GDP has changed (Table 3). The
share of the coastal region, for example, has risen from around one third in the late
1970s to over 40 percent in recent years.
The data also indicate a strong positive relation between initial income and the
pickup in growth during the post-reform period. As illustrated in Figure 2, the
increase in average growth between 1978–82 and 1993–97 was smallest for the
initially poorest southern region, and greatest for the initially richest northeastern
and northern regions.
15While lumping municipalities and provinces is potentially problematic, we chose to maximize the
size of the sample by including municipalities for a number of reasons. First, municipalities are indepen-
dent administrative units, in the same way as provinces, and data for both are collected and compiled in
the same fashion. Second, special features of municipalities—such as their relative prosperity and high
degree of urbanization—should be captured by variables included in the estimations reported below, such
as initial per capita income and agriculture’s share of output. Indeed, the municipalities did not stand out
as outliers in the regressions, and when provincial dummies were included, coefficient estimates for
dummies associated with municipalities were not out of line with those for provinces. Third, the disper-
sion of provincial per capita incomes exhibits an even stronger increase in the 1990s when municipalities
are excluded, suggesting that the convergence to different steady states finding does not rest on the inclu-
sion of municipalities in our sample.Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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Table 2. Regional Per Capita Income Growth Rates
(annual average; in percent)
1978–82 1983–87 1988–92 1993–97 1978–97
North 5.2 9.6 6.7 11.7 8.4
Beijing 4.6 10.4 7.3 10.5 8.4
Tianjin 5.3 8.7 4.7 12.9 8.0
Hebei 4.1 9.5 8.1 13.6 9.0
Shanxi 5.6 8.9 5.5 9.6 7.5
Inner Mongolia 8.4 10.1 6.3 9.3 8.5
Northeast 3.9 10.2 5.6 9.3 7.4
Liaoning 2.9 12.0 5.4 9.5 7.6
Jilin 5.1 12.5 5.6 10.7 8.6
Heilongjiang 4.5 6.6 5.7 8.4 6.4
Coastal 8.4 11.3 9.7 14.4 11.1
Shanghai 5.3 7.6 6.8 13.5 8.4
Jiangsu 8.2 12.8 9.9 14.3 11.4
Zhejiang 11.9 13.8 9.1 15.7 12.6
Fujian 10.4 10.3 10.7 17.0 12.2
Guangdong 9.0 12.2 12.4 13.4 11.9
Shandong 7.8 11.2 8.7 14.6 10.7
Hainan1 . . . 6.6 13.7 8.7 10.4
Southeast 7.4 10.0 5.6 12.7 9.0
Anhui 7.9 10.8 3.6 15.4 9.4
Jiangxi 7.2 8.6 7.8 12.1 9.0
Henan 7.3 11.5 5.9 12.7 9.4
Hubei 8.8 10.1 5.7 12.6 9.3
Hunan 5.9 8.3 5.6 10.7 7.7
South 6.7 9.1 6.6 10.3 8.3
Guangxi 6.5 5.5 7.2 12.8 8.1
Sichuan 6.6 10.6 6.4 10.3 8.5
Guizhou 7.5 9.9 5.2 7.1 7.4
Yunnan 7.0 8.8 7.7 9.2 8.2
West 4.8 10.7 6.7 8.2 7.7
Tibet2 . . . –1.3 4.0 11.6 5.6
Shaanxi 5.9 10.6 6.7 8.2 8.0
Gansu 1.2 10.9 6.8 8.6 7.1
Qinghai 2.5 7.7 3.2 7.2 5.3
Ningxia 3.6 10.3 4.8 8.8 7.0
Xinjiang 7.6 11.9 7.8 7.5 8.7
China 6.0 10.3 7.0 9.4 8.3
Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.
1Data cover 1985–97.
2Data cover 1984–97.CENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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Table 3. Regional Economic Indicators, 1978–97
Share of Regional
Share of Regional GDP Population in Total
in Total GDP (Percent) Population (Percent)
1978–80 1995–97 1978–80 1995–97
North 14.9 12.4 11.5 11.5
Beijing 3.1 2.4 0.9 0.9
Tianjin 2.4 1.6 0.8 0.7
Hebei 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.4
Shanxi 2.6 1.9 2.5 2.6
Inner Mongolia 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.9
Northeast 13.7 10.1 9.1 8.6
Liaoning 6.4 4.6 3.6 3.4
Jilin 2.3 1.9 2.3 2.2
Heilongjiang 5.0 3.5 3.3 3.1
Coastal 32.7 41.7 26.6 26.9
Shanghai 7.4 4.3 1.2 1.1
Jiangsu 7.4 8.8 6.1 5.9
Zhejiang 3.9 6.1 3.9 3.6
Fujian 1.9 3.8 2.6 2.7
Guangdong 5.4 9.5 5.3 5.7
Shandong 6.6 8.7 7.5 7.3
Hainan1 . . . 0.6 . . . 0.6
Southeast 19.8 19.1 26.0 26.1
Anhui 3.3 3.5 5.0 5.0
Jiangxi 2.6 2.2 3.3 3.4
Henan 5.0 5.3 7.4 7.6
Hubei 4.6 4.3 4.8 4.8
Hunan 4.4 3.9 5.4 5.3
South 12.8 12.0 19.8 19.3
Guangxi 2.2 2.7 3.6 3.8
Sichuan 7.3 6.1 10.2 9.3
Guizhou 1.4 1.1 2.8 2.9
Yunnan 2.0 2.1 3.2 3.3
West 6.0 4.8 7.0 7.5
Tibet2 . . . 0.1 . . . 0.2
Shaanxi 2.3 1.7 2.9 3.0
Gansu 1.8 1.0 2.0 2.0
Qinghai 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Ningxia 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Xinjiang 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5
China 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.
1Data cover 1985–97.
2Data cover 1984–97.Economic Structure
A marked transformation in China’s economic structure has taken place since the
late 1970s. The share of the agricultural sector in GDP has fallen by some 10
percentage points to 20 percent. At the same time, the ratio of total investment to
GDP has risen steadily, accompanied by an expansion in investment spending both
by state enterprises as well as the nonstate sector.
While the structural transformation at the national level was generally
reflected in developments in each of the regions, there was significant variation in
the timing, pattern, and extent of transformation across regions. For example,
reform of the agricultural sector was initially introduced in Anhui province in
1978, and later adopted in almost all rural farm households by 1984.16
Consequently, the regions with the largest agricultural sectors (southern and south-
eastern) at the start of the reform process experienced the steepest declines in agri-
culture’s share in regional GDP (Table 4). By contrast, regions where the
agricultural sector was relatively small at the outset (northern and northeastern)
witnessed a much smaller decline in its share in regional GDP. 
Regional differences in the pattern of investment were even more pronounced.
The share of total investment in GDP increased sharply in the northern and coastal
Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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16See Qian (1999).
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Figure 2. Regions’ Initial Income and Per Capita Growth IncreasesCENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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Table 4. Agriculture’s Share in GDP 
(In percent)
1978–82 1983–87 1988–92 1993–97
North 20.4 20.6 18.2 15.8
Beijing 5.1 7.0 8.1 5.8
Tianjin 6.1 7.7 8.9 6.5
Hebei 31.1 30.9 22.9 20.0
Shanxi 22.7 19.7 16.1 14.4
Inner Mongolia 32.5 31.9 32.3 30.2
Northeast 21.6 21.9 17.8 17.7
Liaoning 16.3 16.6 14.9 13.8
Jilin 29.4 31.1 24.9 26.0
Heilongjiang 24.6 24.1 18.1 18.6
Coastal 27.9 28.2 23.1 16.0
Shanghai 3.7 4.1 3.9 2.4
Jiangsu 31.6 31.2 23.2 16.1
Zhejiang 37.4 29.5 23.5 15.5
Fujian 37.1 34.2 28.3 21.6
Guangdong 32.9 31.2 24.9 15.6
Shandong 36.6 35.9 27.8 20.0
Hainan1 . . . 51.0 42.7 34.5
Southeast 43.3 40.4 34.0 27.0
Anhui 48.2 42.3 34.0 26.8
Jiangxi 45.2 41.4 38.1 30.6
Henan 40.9 39.2 32.1 25.1
Hubei 40.6 37.5 32.2 24.7
Hunan 43.7 42.8 36.0 30.3
South 42.9 39.6 34.6 28.3
Guangxi 45.0 43.3 37.6 30.3
Sichuan 42.2 38.0 33.1 27.5
Guizhou 43.2 41.4 38.6 34.8
Yunnan 42.8 39.6 33.5 24.5
West 30.4 31.8 28.0 24.2
Tibet2 . . . 47.3 47.7 43.3
Shaanxi 32.5 30.3 25.3 22.1
Gansu 22.4 27.9 25.8 23.4
Qinghai 26.4 26.9 24.7 21.5
Ningxia 27.3 29.8 24.9 21.4
Xinjiang 39.5 38.9 33.9 27.2
China 30.9 29.5 24.8 19.9
Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.
1Data cover 1985–97.
2Data cover 1984–97.Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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regions over the period as a whole but less so in the other areas. The western
region had the highest share of investment in total output at the start of the sample
period (40 percent of GDP), which rose to 50 percent (Table 5). Despite the rela-
tively high investment ratio, however, the large share of output produced by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs)—about 75 percent—and constraints in their reform
may have led to a buildup of inventories. In the northern and northeastern regions,
much of the rise in the investment rate was also on account of SOEs, while the
increase in the coastal region was mainly due to the nonstate sector. 
The preponderance of SOEs in provincial economies has varied across regions
as well. Although data on the share of state enterprises in total industrial output are
available only from the late 1980s (Table 6), these indicate a sharp decline in the
importance of the state sector in the coastal and southeastern regions. By contrast,
SOEs have continued to account for the majority of industrial output in the north-
eastern and western regions. 
Policies Affecting Economic Performance
Despite restrictions on internal capital mobility, policies have been geared toward
attracting capital and technology from abroad. There was a marked shift in
China’s foreign investment policies in the second half of the 1980s, including the
introduction of special tax incentives to encourage investment in certain indus-
tries. FDI flows increased sharply from less than US$1 billion in 1983 to over
US$40 billion in 1997. The inflows showed a dramatic increase in the coastal
region, where they rose to over 9 percent of provincial GDP and accounted for an
important source of investment spending (Table 7). More recently, the northern
and northeastern regions have also seen a sizable increase in FDI inflows. As
illustrated in Figure 3, initially rich provinces have tended to attract relatively
greater inflows of FDI.
An important mechanism for reallocating financial capital across provinces
has been the pattern of lending by the banking system, which until the mid-1990s
was subject to credit quotas set by the State Planning Commission (SPC) in
conjunction with the People’s Bank of China (PBC). Credit quotas for each
province were established on an annual basis to meet policy objectives. Banks in
provinces with quotas that were high in relation to their deposit growth financed
their lending by borrowing from the PBC, while banks in provinces where credit
quotas were relatively tight ended up having to maintain high excess reserves with
the PBC. As a result, there was a close link between the credit plan and central
bank lending, and the PBC played an important role in redistributing financial
resources across provinces.
These flows of financial capital appear to have reflected redistributive policy
objectives rather than consumption-smoothing or differences in rates of return on
investment across provinces. Using data covering 1988–93, Lardy (1998) finds
that the provincial share of industrial output produced by SOEs was the most
important variable explaining variations in provincial loan to deposit ratios, withCENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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Table 5. Ratio of Total Investment to GDP 
(In percent)
1978–82 1983–87 1988–92 1993–97
North 30.2 41.4 44.5 51.5
Beijing 28.4 51.9 60.2 76.4
Tianjin 31.2 42.3 49.9 57.3
Hebei 30.1 35.4 36.2 43.0
Shanxi 31.4 44.9 42.5 40.6
Inner Mongolia 30.5 34.4 40.8 47.2
Northeast 25.0 34.2 37.4 37.9
Liaoning 22.8 31.6 37.3 38.2
Jilin 30.6 35.0 39.4 41.1
Heilongjiang 25.1 37.5 36.5 35.4
Coastal 27.9 35.7 40.0 47.9
Shanghai 20.9 35.5 45.3 59.3
Jiangsu 30.4 40.6 43.7 48.5
Zhejiang 25.9 33.1 34.5 47.9
Fujian 30.3 31.9 31.1 44.5
Guangdong 29.2 34.9 36.6 43.6
Shandong 32.0 36.1 43.5 46.8
Hainan1 . . .  . . .  61.2 57.7
Southeast 26.0 31.8 34.0 39.0
Anhui 19.8 31.7 31.9 40.3
Jiangxi 33.4 33.3 35.6 38.2
Henan 30.3 36.4 41.1 41.0
Hubei 24.7 31.2 31.8 40.3
Hunan 22.9 25.5 28.0 34.2
South 33.3 32.0 32.1 39.4
Guangxi 29.7 30.1 29.6 36.1
Sichuan 33.3 32.3 32.2 40.2
Guizhou 36.2 32.3 32.4 35.8
Yunnan 35.5 32.5 33.8 43.4
West 40.4 43.1 45.8 50.6
Tibet2 . . .  . . .  45.9 47.1
Shaanxi 34.5 42.7 43.2 46.7
Gansu 37.9 37.7 41.6 40.2
Qinghai 57.5 54.1 45.0 48.7
Ningxia 54.0 58.1 57.8 51.8
Xinjiang 44.9 47.4 53.8 63.5
China 35.1 36.0 35.7 40.6
Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.
1Data cover 1990–97.
2Data cover 1992–97.Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
378








































Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.CENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
379
Table 7. Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 
(In percent)
1985–87 1988–92 1993–97
North 0.5 0.9 4.1
Beijing 1.3 3.0 7.5
Tianjin 1.4 1.1 13.1
Hebei 0.1 0.3 1.9
Shanxi 0.0 0.2 0.8
Inner Mongolia 0.1 0.1 0.7
Northeast 0.2 0.7 3.3
Liaoning 0.3 1.1 4.7
Jilin 0.2 0.3 2.5
Heilongjiang 0.1 0.3 1.9
Coastal 1.1 2.4 9.2
Shanghai 1.1 1.6 11.1
Jiangsu 0.2 1.1 7.2
Zhejiang 0.2 0.4 3.1
Fujian 1.1 4.2 14.8
Guangdong 3.8 5.6 15.6
Shandong 0.2 0.9 4.2
Hainan . . . 7.2 19.1
Southeast 0.1 0.2 1.9
Anhui 0.1 0.2 1.7
Jiangxi 0.1 0.3 2.0
Henan 0.1 0.2 1.3
Hubei 0.1 0.4 2.2
Hunan 0.1 0.2 2.1
South 0.2 0.3 2.7
Guangxi 0.7 0.6 4.4
Sichuan 0.1 0.2 3.2
Guizhou 0.2 0.2 0.7
Yunnan 0.1 0.1 0.6
West 0.3 0.3 1.4
Tibet 0.0 0.0 0.0
Shaanxi 0.6 0.7 2.7
Gansu 0.0 0.0 0.9
Qinghai 0.0 0.0 0.2
Ningxia 0.0 0.0 0.6
Xinjiang 0.4 0.0 0.5
China 0.7 1.2 5.3
Sources: State Statistical Bureau; The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95;  China
Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and authors’ calculations.provinces with a high SOE concentration tending to have higher ratios. Since
interest rates on loans were administered—generally well below market-clearing
levels—and lending was not solely based on commercial factors, provinces with
high loan ratios were, in effect, recipients of significant financial transfers. Data
on loan-deposit ratios are available for the last two subperiods—1988–92 and
1993–97 (Table 8). The data indicate that the two regions with relatively high
shares of industrial output produced by SOEs—the northeast and the west—had
among the highest loan-deposit ratios. 
As regards fiscal policy, China started in 1979 to devolve authority from the
central government to provincial and other forms of local government. The devo-
lution of authority was accompanied by the provision of fiscal incentives. The
unified revenue collection and spending system was replaced by a fiscal
contracting system. Under the new system, local governments entered into long-
term (usually five-year) fiscal contracts with higher level governments and many
were allowed to retain 100 percent of the marginal revenue received. Jin, Qian, and
Weingast (1999) show that the fiscal contracting system provided provincial
governments with strong marginal fiscal incentives. They find a strong correlation
between marginal budgetary revenue collection and marginal budgetary expendi-
ture in the 1980s relative to the 1970s. They also find that higher marginal contrac-
tual revenue retention rates were associated with faster development of nonstate
enterprises and more reform in state enterprises. 
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Figure 3. Provinces’ Initial Income and FDI InflowsCENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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Sources: Lardy (1998); People’s Bank of China; Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking,
various issues; and authors’ calculations.
1Data missing for 1994.
2Data missing for 1994–96.The data on provincial revenue and expenditure indicate a strong positive corre-
lation between the provincial revenue to expenditure ratio with per capita income
(Table 9). For example, the coastal region and the three municipalities—where per
capita incomes are the highest—also have the highest revenue-expenditure ratios. At
the same time, these ratios are lowest in the western and southern regions, where per
capita incomes are also the lowest. This suggests that fiscal policy has also been used
in a redistributive manner. 
However, it is important to note several qualifications regarding the provincial
fiscal data. First, these data are available only from 1983, and from three different
sources that are occasionally inconsistent for overlapping years.17 Moreover, they
do not appear to include revenue and expenditure by the central government in
each province, which could significantly affect the measurement of the redistribu-
tive nature of national fiscal policy. To the extent that such taxation and spending
were redistributive, their omission from the regression equation could understate
the estimated speed of convergence. Finally, the impact of redistributive fiscal
policy on growth would depend critically on the form of redistribution. For
example, the growth implications of income transfers could be very different from
those associated with infrastructure investment.
III. Estimation Results
The empirical analysis tests for convergence of per capita incomes across
provinces by estimating a growth equation that is derived as a log-linear approx-
imation of the transition path of per capita output around its steady state level.18
The equation, given below, specifies the average growth rate of per capita output
over the interval t–T and t as a function of initial output and other variables. 
ln(yit/yit–T) = C – (1–e–β T) ln(yit–T) + xit + ε it, (1)
where i indexes the province, T is the length of the observation interval, t is time
period, yit–T is real per capita output at time t–T, the beginning of the 
subperiod, yit is real per capita income at time t,a n d   β is the convergence coeffi-
cient. The convergence coefficient (β) indicates the rate at which yit–T approaches
the steady state level of GDP per capita. A positive coefficient implies that the
poorer provinces grow faster than the richer ones. The higher is β , the more rapid
is the convergence to steady state. The variable C is the constant term common
across provinces, xit includes the vector of other explanatory variables, and ε it is
an independent error term. 
The usual role of the explanatory variables is to capture the structural char-
acteristics of the economy that determine the steady state level of per capita
income. Traditional variables included in the cross-country growth literature are
Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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17See Appendix I for a list of the data sources.
18The equation for the rate of economic growth is based on the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
version of the Solow-Swan model. See also Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).CENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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Table 9. Fiscal Revenue to Expenditure Ratio
1983–87 1988–92 1993–97
North 1.09 0.95 0.69
Beijing 1.59 1.17 0.65
Tianjin 1.83 1.23 0.85
Hebei 1.10 0.97 0.71
Shanxi 0.82 0.92 0.69
Inner Mongolia 0.34 0.53 0.54
Northeast 1.09 0.96 0.69
Liaoning 1.62 1.20 0.78
Jilin 0.66 0.73 0.56
Heilongjiang 0.77 0.84 0.65
Coastal 1.78 1.16 0.83
Shanghai 4.93 2.07 1.05
Jiangsu 1.82 1.30 0.83
Zhejiang 1.58 1.29 0.93
Fujian1 0.79 0.85 0.84
Guangdong 0.99 0.95 0.82
Shandong 1.24 0.86 0.64
Hainan2 0.35 0.78
Southeast 1.00 0.89 0.70
Anhui 0.93 0.83 0.82
Jiangxi 0.71 0.76 0.70
Henan 1.01 0.92 0.68
Hubei 1.20 0.96 0.69
Hunan 1.02 0.90 0.67
South 0.76 0.85 0.73
Guangxi3 0.65 0.85 0.57
Sichuan 0.93 0.88 0.74
Guizhou 0.58 0.76 0.54
Yunnan 0.69 0.84 0.55
West 0.46 0.59 0.51
Tibet –0.05 0.05 0.06
Shaanxi 0.72 0.77 0.68
Gansu 0.68 0.73 0.60
Qinghai 0.24 0.43 0.39
Ningxia 0.29 0.44 0.43
Xinjiang 0.31 0.47 0.43
China 1.13 0.94 0.73
Sources: World Bank (1994); People’s Bank of China; Almanac of China’s Finance and
Banking,v arious issues; State Statistical Bureau; China Statistical Yearbook,v arious issues; and
authors’ calculations.
1Data missing for 1991.
2Data cover 1988–97.
3Data missing for 1993–94.the investment rate and educational characteristics. While time series data on
educational characteristics by province or region were not available, we included
the share of investment to provincial GDP and the private-public mix of produc-
tion, as reflected in the share of SOEs in industrial output, in the regressions. As
highlighted above, the dominance of SOEs in industrial production has varied
sharply across the regions. Structural and institutional reforms that improve
economic incentives and resource allocation and remove impediments to private
sector development are likely to increase the productive capacity of the economy
and have an effect on economic growth.19
The remaining variables included in the analysis are policy variables that
appear to be particularly relevant in the Chinese context. These include the share
of FDI flows to provincial GDP, the ratio of revenue to expenditure, and the ratio
of bank loans to deposits.20 As noted earlier, higher FDI flows could imply either
more openness, and thereby a higher rate of convergence, or access to different
technology, implying convergence to a different steady state, at least in the short
run. The rate of convergence would also be affected by the extent of the redis-
tributive nature of bank lending and provincial fiscal policies.
The equation is estimated separately for each subperiod (1978–82, 1983–87,
1988–92, 1993–97) and for the entire sample period. The estimation results for
each subperiod are based on iterative, nonlinear least squares that allow for
heteroskedasticity in the subperiods. For the full sample, the estimates are
derived using the seemingly unrelated regression approach (SURE), which also
allows for correlation of the error terms across the subperiods. For comparison,
pooled nonlinear regressions with regional and time dummies were also esti-
mated over the corresponding sample period. As shown below, there is little
difference in the full sample estimates except for the estimation results for the
period 1988–97. Since data on all the explanatory variables are not available for
the entire period, the estimation results are presented for different sample periods
(Tables 10, 11, and 12). 
Sample Period 1978–97
The first column of Table 10 shows the regression estimates of the convergence
coefficient (β ), based on equation (1) where the explanatory variables include only
a constant and the log of each province’s initial per capita income in that subpe-
riod. Rows 1–4 of column 1 present the results for each subperiod.
The estimate of β in the first subperiod, 1978–82, is 0.016 or 1.6 percent and is
positively significant. This implies that 1.6 percent of the gap between current output
Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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19See Khan (1987) for a review of the nature and evidence for such an effect.
20The loan to deposit ratio is intended to capture the redistributive nature of bank lending, or the
extent to which the banking system was a net borrower or net lender in a particular province. Another
possibility would be to consider credit availability, measured as the change in real credit, scaled by
provincial GDP. Such a variable would be highly correlated with investment, however, and its construc-
tion is complicated by the use of multiple sources of data for bank loans and deposits.per capita and the steady state per capita output is closed in one year. However, the
estimates for the second and third subperiods are insignificant, while the estimated
convergence coefficient in the fourth subperiod is negatively significant. Large FDI
flows, which surged in the fourth period into the northern and coastal regions, may
be viewed as a positive shock that benefited the richer provinces.21 If the estimate of
β is constrained to be the same for all subperiods, the resulting joint estimate of β is
0.001 and is not significant. However, a Wald test for the equality of the coefficients
across the subperiods rejects the hypothesis that β is stable over the subperiods. 
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2 Beta Investment R
2
1978–82 0.016* 0.123 0.020* 0.658 0.021* –0.0257 0.66
(0.005) 0.086 (0.005) 0.06 (0.006) (0.065) 0.061
1983–87 0.005 0.015 0.018* 0.398 0.017** –0.046 0.402
(0.005) 0.078 (0.008) 0.068 (0.010) (0.124) 0.069
1988–92 –0.003 0.009 0.008 0.557 0.007 –0.014 0.558
(0.004) 0.072 (0.006) 0.053 (0.007) (0.067) 0.055
1993–97 –0.017* 0.162 –0.004 0.721 0.001 0.056 0.724
(0.006) 0.083 (0.007) 0.053 (0.011) (0.106) 0.054
Restricted (SURE) 0.001 0.011** 0.013* 0.062*
coefficients (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.029)
Restricted (NLOLS) –0.0002 0.49 0.011* 0.72 0.013* 0.059** 0.73
coefficients (0.003) 0.082 (0.004) 0.062 (0.004) (0.034) 0.062
Wald test
Chi square 24.482 7.142 6.939
Degrees of freedom 3 3 6
p-value 0.000 0.068 0.327
Chi square (0.05) 7.815 7.815 12.592
Degrees of freedom 3 3 6
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 10
percent level.
21Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a) find that the estimated speed of convergence in the U.S. was nega-
tive over the period 1920–30. This was attributed to large declines in the relative price of agricultural
commodities that affected the poorer agricultural states adversely. Column 2 of Table 10 presents the estimated speed of convergence when
regional dummies are incorporated. These dummies proxy for differences in the
steady state levels of per capita income to which the provinces of China are
converging. Six regional dummies are included for the different regions discussed
before—the north, northeast, coastal, south, southeast, and west. The inclusion of
regional dummies improves the fit of the estimated equations over the subperiods
suggesting that regional differences are significant.22 The estimated value of the
convergence coefficient over the subperiod 1978–82 increases from 0.016 to 0.02
and is positively significant. The estimated coefficient for the subperiod 1983–88
also becomes positively significant (β = 0.018). However, the coefficients in the
third and fourth subperiods are insignificant. The estimate of the restricted β
increases to 0.011 or an estimated rate of convergence of 1.1 percent. The Wald test
for equality of the coefficients suggests that the hypothesis of a stable β across the
subperiods can still be rejected at the 5 percent level, but not at the 10 percent level.
In contrast to the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992a, and 1992b) results for
U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, and eight European economies, these estima-
tions do not provide support for the hypothesis of unconditional convergence.
Rather, these results suggest that regions of China are converging to different
steady state levels of per capita income. 
Column 3 of Table 10 includes the ratio of total investment to provincial GDP
in the estimations. While this coefficient is not significant for the subperiods, the
hypothesis of equality of these coefficients across the subperiods cannot be
rejected using the Wald test, and the restricted coefficient for total investment is
positively significant. Moreover, the inclusion of this variable affects the estimated
rate of convergence, which increases to 1.3 percent in the combined regression and
is now significant at the 5 percent level.23
Sample Period 1983–97
Since data on FDI flows and revenue and expenditure at the provincial level are not
available prior to 1983, the relationship between these variables and per capita
growth was examined over the sample 1983–97.24 Table 11 presents these results.
The inclusion of the FDI variable leads to an increase in the estimated rate of conver-
gence in the 1983–87 and 1993–97 subperiods. The Wald test again indicates that
the hypothesis of restricted coefficients over the subperiods cannot be rejected.25
Anuradha Dayal-Gulati and Aasim M.Husain
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22However, these differences do not appear to be significant at the provincial level. Estimations using
fixed effects for each province to test whether each province was converging to its own steady state were
not supported by the data. 
23Khan and Kumar (1997) also examine the effect of investment on the speed of convergence for a
sample of developing countries. They find that the higher the ratio of investment to GDP, the higher is the
rate of growth of per capita income. The estimated size of the convergence coefficient, taking into account
regional differences, is 1.4 percent, which is very close to the estimated convergence coefficient for China.
24Average levels of the FDI flows over 1985–87 are used for the second subperiod under the assump-
tion that the level of FDI flows was close to zero in 1983 and 1984. 
25While the estimated coefficients of this equation may, in principle, be affected by collinearity
between total investment and FDI, there was actually very little correlation between the two variables
over the sample period. The estimates indicate that FDI flows appear to be positively related to per
capita income growth, implying that capital mobility appears to have had a strong
effect on the rate of convergence. The estimated rate of convergence increases to
1.8 percent—broadly comparable to results obtained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
of around 2 percent for the U.S., Japan, and Europe. The estimate obtained for
China implies that it takes 38 years to eliminate one-half of the initial gap in per
capita incomes.26
The ratio of revenue to expenditure for the provinces appears to have little rela-
tion to per capita growth. These results may be due to the problems surrounding the
provincial fiscal data noted above, and to the fact that the ratios used are average
CENTRIPETAL FORCES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
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Table 11. Estimation Results, 1983–97
(1) (2)
Total Total
Beta Investment FDI R2 Beta Investment FDI Rev/Exp R2
1983–87 0.025* 0.225* 0.020* 0.49 0.034* 0.057 0.019* 0.035 0.51
(0.008) (0.080) (0.008) 0.065 (0.009) (0.083) (0.007) (0.025) 0.066
1988–92 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.57 0.011 0.003 0.009 –0.001 0.57
(0.008) 0.061 (0.011) 0.055 (0.011) (0.062) (0.011) (0.048) 0.057
1993–97 0.017** 0.128 0.032* 0.78 0.022** 0.175 0.024** 0.081 0.79
(0.009) (0.094) (0.011) 0.05 (0.013) (0.116) (0.015) (0.080) 0.05
Restricted 
(SURE) 0.018* 0.100** 0.019* 0.019* 0.106* 0.019* 0.006
coefficients (0.006) (0.055) (0.006) (0.007) (0.053) (0.006) (0.027)
Restricted 
(NLOLS) 0.020* 0.109* 0.020* 0.74 0.019* 0.109* 0.020* –0.001 0.74
coefficients (0.007) (0.055) (0.007) 0.06 (0.007) (0.052) (0.007) (0.024) 0.06
Wald test








Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 10
percent level.
26The time t for which log (y(t)) is halfway between log (y(0)) and log (y*) satisfies the condition























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.revenue to expenditure rather than marginal revenue to expenditure as mentioned
by Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999). Moreover, revenue contracting practices
between different levels of government were subject to frequent negotiation and
change. Institutional changes in 1992–94, which included a shift towards formal
fiscal federalism, may also have affected these results.
Sample Period 1988–97
In order to incorporate data on loan-deposit ratios and the share of SOEs in
industrial output—which are only available from the late 1980s—the regressions
were estimated over a further restricted sample period spanning 1988–97.27 The
constraints imposed by the small sample period, however, are reflected in the
estimation results. The variables appear to behave differently over the two
subperiods 1988–92 and 1993–97. Therefore, the Wald test rejects the hypoth-
esis that all coefficients are similar across the subperiods. The results suggest
that the estimate of a stable β coefficient and for the share of SOEs in total
industrial output across the subperiods cannot be rejected, but the coefficients on
the other variables are different across these periods. These results are shown in
Table 12. 
In contrast to the FDI flows, the loan-deposit ratio appears to have a nega-
tive impact on growth. The loan-deposit ratio is negatively significant over the
1988–92 subperiod. This may be due to the fact that SOEs—which faced soft
budget constraints and did not invest on purely commercial principles—received
the bulk of the credit from state banks. Nonstate enterprises, by contrast,
received only limited credit and faced much harder budget constraints. In the
late 1980s and the early 1990s, loans to SOEs accounted for about 80 percent of
all nonagricultural loans, while loans to the nonstate sector consisting of town-
ship and village enterprises (TVEs) accounted for only about 8 percent of nona-
gricultural loans.28 Hence, the negative relationship between the loan-deposit
ratio and growth could be due to the fact that these transfers tended to support
inefficient SOEs and thereby dampened growth. 
If the share of SOEs in total industrial output is included in the estimations,
this ratio is negatively significant in the subperiod 1993–97. The negative coef-
ficient for the share of SOEs in total output in the pooled estimations also
suggests that the higher this share, the lower was the rate of economic growth.
Hence, the results appear to suggest that enhanced commercial orientation of the
SOEs and changes in bank lending policies could have an important positive
effect on long-run growth. 
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27Instead of total investment in provincial GDP, the share of fixed investment in provincial GDP is
used as an explanatory variable as these two measures began to diverge in the 1990s. 
28People’s Bank of China (1993). IV. Conclusions
The estimation results indicate that the regions of China are converging, but to
different steady state levels of income. The pattern of FDI flows—and the associ-
ated technology transfer—appears to have a strong effect on the results. The rela-
tively rich coastal and north/northeastern regions, though perhaps more expensive
(in terms of labor costs) than the inland regions, were probably able to attract more
FDI precisely because of their relative prosperity and, consequently, more devel-
oped infrastructure. The resulting FDI flows boosted the speed of convergence,
albeit—at least in the short run—to different steady states for the different regions. 
The results suggest that structural characteristics of the regions also appear to
have been important factors determining growth and convergence. For example,
the total investment rate appears to be positively correlated with growth, while the
prevalence of SOEs and high bank loan-deposit ratios tend to be associated with
lower growth. These findings would seem to imply that enhanced commercial
orientation of production and the banking system is likely to have a positive
impact on growth.
The disparity in provincial/regional incomes and the observed convergence to
different steady states may also be related to the gradual and experimental nature
of market-oriented reforms in China. As noted by Bell, Khor, and Kochhar (1993),
reform measures tended to be introduced on an experimental basis in some local-
ities—often as a result of local initiatives—and expanded to a national scale only
when they had proved successful at the local level. The decentralization of
authority led local governments to assume greater responsibility for state fixed
investment, initially in industry, but later in infrastructure as well.29 The introduc-
tion of agricultural reform and the establishment of special economic zones were
also based on local experimentation. In addition, local governments played an
important role in attracting foreign investment into their localities. Hence, this
pattern of development may give rise to strong local effects in the estimation
results. Unless localities within regions tended to adopt reforms at the same time,
however, such effects would not be able to explain estimated regional differences
in steady state income levels.
APPENDIX I
Data Sources and Description
Data on provinces’ real and nominal GDP, GDP per capita, agriculture share of GDP, total
investment, and fixed investment were taken from The Gross Domestic Product of China,
1952–95, and from various issues of the annual China Statistical Yearbook. Provincial popula-
tion data were calculated by dividing GDP by GDP per capita; implicit GDP deflators for each
province were calculated from the nominal and real GDP series.
Data on provinces’ industrial output, industrial output of SOEs, and foreign direct invest-
ment were taken from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook.
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29See, for example, Qian (1999), Bell, Khor, and Kochhar (1993), and Tseng and others (1994).Data on bank deposits and loans in each province were taken from Lardy (1998) for
1988–93, and from various issues of the annual Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking for
1994–97. Data for 1997 refer only to loans and deposits with the four state commercial banks,
which account for around three-quarters of total bank loans and deposits.
Data on provincial revenues and expenditures were taken from World Bank (1994) for
1983–90, from various issues of the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking for 1991–94, and
from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook for 1995–97. As noted above, these data do
not appear to include central government revenues and expenditures in each province. Moreover,
data from the different sources are occasionally inconsistent for years for which overlapping
observations are available.
APPENDIX II
Labor and Capital Mobility
Labor Mobility
The mobility of labor across China’s provinces—and indeed from rural to urban areas within
provinces—has been limited by policy and institutional factors. Under the household registra-
tion system, adopted in 1948, households were designated as either urban or rural; urban house-
holds were granted the right to reside in cities and small towns, access to state subsidized grain
supplies, and employment in state enterprises. The 1958 Regulation on the Registration of
Households required households to register their place of residence and to gain permission for
any change in residence. Such permission has generally been difficult to obtain.
Following the adoption of agricultural reforms in 1980, rural households’ mobility
increased somewhat. Communes were disbanded and households no longer had to meet com-
mune production quotas. The new household responsibility system allowed rural households to
determine their allocation of labor between farm and nonfarm activities, which in principle
meant that household members could leave the land. However, permission to move under the
household registration system remained strictly limited, implying that rural residents could not
legally reside in urban areas. In addition, migration without permission was extremely difficult,
as it involved forgoing the benefits that legal residence carried, including food rations, housing,
access to schooling for children, and a formal system of old age security. While food and hous-
ing have become increasingly available on a market basis over the past decade, unregistered
migration remains constrained.
Notwithstanding the impediments to urban migration, the number of migrants has
increased steadily, particularly since the mid-1980s, when the growth in rural incomes began to
taper off as the initial boost from rural reforms subsided. Estimates of the total number of
migrants range from 30 million to 200 million; the World Bank estimated, extrapolating on the
basis of survey data, the total at 40 million in the mid-1990s. This excluded an additional esti-
mated 30 million workers who commuted from rural to urban areas on a daily basis.30
The limited mobility of labor has been reflected in data on provinces’ shares in China’s
total population, which have remained virtually unchanged over the past two decades (see Table
3). While these data do not capture unregistered migration, much of this has likely been from
rural to urban areas within provinces rather than across provinces. Hence, such migration is not
likely to have altered the provincial population shares in a substantial manner.
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In addition to limiting the mobility of labor, government policies have, in effect, had a damp-
ening impact on the mobility of capital across provinces. Empirical evidence supports the
hypothesis that interprovincial capital mobility has indeed been limited.
Tax policies
The profit retention system, which was in place in the early 1980s, discouraged regional capi-
tal mobility.31 Under this system, enterprises’ transfers to other locations resulted in a loss in
profits accruing to the local government, as retained profits were part of local revenue. In
1983–84, modifications to the revenue-sharing system—which involved the decentralization of
plan formulation, lowering of plan production targets, and permission to sell above plan output
on the market—resulted in a sharp increase in enterprise investment, although the incentive to
retain funds within local jurisdictions remained high.
In the late 1980s, following the introduction of the contract responsibility system, which
fixed profit remittances by enterprises, and a system of revenue-sharing between different lev-
els of government, localities have increasingly offered incentives to attract investment. Indeed,
according to the World Bank (1994), there has been a proliferation of tax exemptions offered
by localities once they have arranged to fulfill their revenue target specified in the contract with
the level of government directly above.32As a result, the interregional capital mobility that does
take place is based on tax differentials rather than differentials in resource endowments or cost
advantages.
Empirical tests of capital mobility
Empirical evidence presented by Zhao (1998) supports the view that the degree of capital
mobility within China is limited, and that the interprovincial capital flows that have taken place
have not generally reflected optimizing behavior by investors seeking to equalize rates of return
on investment. The empirical tests are based on the proposition that, under perfect capital
mobility, an increase in a province’s saving rate should be reflected in an increase in all
provinces’ investment rates, since saving would flow to all provinces to equalize the rates of
return on investment. 
Zhao (1998) finds that the correlation between provinces’saving and investment rates have
generally been high, suggesting that capital has not been freely mobile across provinces. The
high correlations remain even after adjusting for the effect of common factors on saving and
investment rates. Zhao also finds that correlations were somewhat lower in provinces where the
share of investment in the state enterprise sector was large, suggesting that the capital that moved
across provincial boundaries was that of the state-owned sector, in which optimizing investment
decisions are likely to have played a relatively small role. Conversely, in provinces with the high-
est shares of private investment in total investment—such as the coastal provinces—the correla-
tion between saving and investment rates was particularly high. Adjusting for this effect, the
degree of integration—capital mobility—across provinces is small.
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30World Bank (1997). Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996) estimate the total number of migrants at
100–150 million.
31A detailed discussion of the institutional aspects of taxation policy and its effect on interregional
capital mobility is contained in World Bank (1994).
32The World Bank (1994) estimates that there were 1,800 special zones granting tax concessions at
the county level or above in early 1993.REFERENCES
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